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ABSTRACT

·Traditional inheritance customs of village communities,can be viewed as
rules governing intergenerational wealth transfers.

Parents' choices among

education,.· land, and nonland assets as transfers to children are modeled
assuming individualistic,preferences of parents in an agriculturalhousehold.
Empirical evidence is provided from a retrospective survey of five rice
growing villages in the Philippines.

Parental gender preference in

inheritance decisions is examined using family fixed effects estimates with
interactions between gender of the child and parental endowments.

Results

indicate that, in level terms, daughters receive more education and total
inheritance but less land.

When family fixed effects are accounted for,

however, education is gender-neutral, nonland asset transfers weakly favor
daughters, and sons receive higher values of·land and total inheritance.
Interactions of child gender with parent endowments are relatively unimportant
determinants of educational levels, although they are significant in bestowals
of nonhuman capital.

Daughters of better educated mothers, land-owning

fathers, and land-owning mothers receive higher levels of land and nonland
assets.

On the other hand, better educated fathers and parents cultivating

larger areas tend to bestow land and nonland assets preferentially to sons.

Key words:

intergenerational transfers, bargaining models, agricultural
households

Subject index: economic demography and labor economics; agriculture,
technical change and science policy
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INTERGENERATIONAL WEALTH TRANSFERS IN PHILIPPINE RICE VILLAGES:
Gender Differences in Traditional InheritanceCustoms 1

Agnes R. Quisumbing

1.

Introduction
The process of intergenerational wealth transmission in rural societies

is manifested in traditional inheritance customs and practices of village
communities. · Substitution among children, land rights, and human capital as
alternative forms of holding wealth,; and differences in wealth-holding by men
and women have profound implications on both intra- and intergenerational
inequality, occupational mobility, and migration.
In the rural Philippines, for example, transfers made by parents at the
time of their children's marriage may·have a significant impact on respective
spouses' subsequent bargaining power.
marriage among rural families.

Land plays an important part in

A parcel of land usually forms the main

portion of the bride gift, or male land dowry, and is among several points
bargained for between parents at the time of the formal marriage proposal
(Anderson 1962; Scheans 1965; Lewis 1971).

Other assets, like farm animals,

residential lots, or a residential house, may also be provided to the

1
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newlyweds as part of the fund needed to establish them as a separate family
unit (Fegan 1982) . 2

Gifts and transfers.. at-'.:athe time of marriage, however,. are

not the only transfers made by parents to-children, since they may have
invested previously in their children's human ,capital. Transfer· .behavior by•,,,
parents and gender differences in inheritance customs are therefore observed
in educational levels and bestowals of land and other, assets to children.
Differences in human capital investment and inherited assets may
influence the bargaining position of household members and subsequent
decisions taken with respect to fertility, schooling, and transfers to
children.

Bargaining models of the household posit that individually-owned

assets and the incomes therefrom may be significant determinants of household
behavior.

Empirical applications of the Nash-bargaining model provide

evidence for differential effects of male and female unearned incomes
leisure choice (Horney and McElroy 1988), and in

on

developing countries, on

fertility and the probability that a woman engages in wage labor (Schultz
1990) and on family health outcomes (Thomas 1990a; 1990b).
Although there is evidence for gender differences in household resource
allocation to children, it is not clear whether this is the result of genetic
or ability differences, parental response to expected gender wage
differentials, systematic differences by gender in the cost of investment in

2

In his account of frontier life in a Central Luzon barrio, Fegan (1982:99)
states: "In the marriage negotiations between parents, each family stated what
components of their establishment fund it would be responsible for in a process
of matching contributions of goods and labor. Aside from workbeasts, other farm
equipment
could be made by skilled older kinsmen.
Kinsmen could also
cooperate in the initial clearing of a farm, building a house, and making
essential household equipment."
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children, or parental gender preference (Behrman, Pollak and Taubman 1986). 3
While parental allocation of human capital investment inay mildly reinforce
gender wage differentials in the United States, this is offset by parental
preferences which exhibit equal . concern for or<slightly favor·..girls :(.Behrman,c
Pollak and Taubman 1986).

Discrimination against females in the

· intrahousehold distribution of..-nutrients is,· not..,supported by .,the ,equivalence.".
scale literature (Deaton 1989, cited in Thomas 1990a) at least in Cote
d'Ivoire and may be due to different activity levels (Pitt, Rosenzweig and
Hassan 1990).

Behrman and Deolalikar (1990) find differential adjustment of

male a:hd'female··nutrient intakes to changes in food prices in India, but their
data'do not show lower average nutrient intakes-nor higher variances in
females over males.

In contrast, Thomas (1990a, 1990b), using data from the.

United States, Brazil, and Ghana, finds that mother's education has-a bigger
impact on daughter's height than on son's height, while father's education
affects son's height more.
Intergenerational wealth transfers from parents to children are analyzed
in five rice-growing villages in the Philippines.

An additional perspective

is obtained by modeling the intergenerational transfer as the outcome of
bargaining between parents. 4

This approach differs from common preference

models of intergenerational transfers where a single parent or both parents

3

Behrman et al. (1986: 33) define gender preference to mean that parents
value identical outcomes at identical cost more highly for one sex than for the
other.
4

The use of a bargaining model to describe interactions within Philippine
households can be justified since smooth interpersonal relations are not attached
to established rules or ideals, nor to an ethical system, but are maintained
through negotiation (Lewis 1971:84). The' result is a "social pragmatism" in
negotiating conflict avoidance and adjusting social relations to accomodate
.changes in .the. life. cycle or family. fortunes .(Lopez 1991 :.. 7).
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acting collectively make transfers to children due to altruism (Becker 1974;
Becker and Tomes 1979}. 'It also- departs ,from more- recent studies which have,
modeled transfers as outcomes of strategic behavior between parents and
children (Bernheim, Schleifer and Summers 1985;·Cox-1987; Cox and Jimenez
1990).

This paper focuses on gender differences in transfers received, in the

forms of, education, land -and -nonland assets. •- Parental-- gender preference,. in 0-:,,
inheritance decisions is examined using family fixed effects estimates with
interactions between gender of the child and endowments of the parents.
Empirical evidence is provided from a sample of 331 households with 2241
children in five Philippine rice-growing villages.

A retrospective survey was

conducted from July>to October -1989 to acquire family-inheritance histories ,..y;
for three generations, namely the parents', children's (respondents') and
grandchildren's generations.·- Data is available on .parents' characteristics,
schooling and inheritance of the respondent and siblings, and on the
respondent's spouse and children.

This paper focuses on decisions made by the

·parents of current•·respondents, since fertility decisions;·.. and.most
inheritance and schooling decisions, would have been completed by the time of
the survey.
The agricultural household model (Singh, Squire, Strauss 1986) is
modified to consider intergenerational wealth transfers (Becker and Tomes
1979, Tornes 1981) and a bargaining approach to household decision making
(McElroy and Horney 1981, Manser and Brown 1981), although we do not impose a
particular bargaining rule on the decision-making process.
The paper is organized as follows.

Part 2 briefly reviews the

literature on intergenerational transfers and presents a model of
intergenerational wealth transfers for an agricultural household in which

5

.parents have individual preferences.

Part 3 describes the data and presents

the regression -results for both level. and ,family fixed effects ,estimates, .._,.,, ,:, ,:.,.
Part 4 presents the summary and conclusions.

A data appendix-describes the

study villages in greater detail.

2.

Intergenerational Wealth Transfers and the Agricultural·· Household , .,·· ,_,_.,.,,:._.,
2.1

Theories of Intergenerational Transfers

Inheritance rules can be viewed as an intergenerational contract between
parents and children.

The l~terature on private income transfers suggests

three mcftTves •''for ·intergenerational· transfers:
insurance.

altruism, exchange, and

In the altruistic model (Becker 1974, Becker and Tomes 1979), a

benevolent individual (parent) cares about the well being of other individuals
(children) and makes -transfers to. them.

In this modeL, parents maximize a

utility function spanning generations, in which utility depends on the ,
consumption of parents and the quantity and quality of children.

Parents

curtail current -consumption due to· altruistic -concern for their children and.:,>,
maximize utility by choosing optimal investments in the human and nonhuman
capital of children.
The parental utility function can be written as

(1)

where C is the number of children,
when they become adults,

zP

z0

is per capita consumption of children

is parental consumption, and

of goods and leisure by parents and children,

zi

zi = (xi, li).

is consumption
Typically,

child consumption is assumed equal across children in the same family and

zP
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is treated as the aggregate of parents' consumption, without any distinction
.between consumption by individual parents.
An income generating function for children is·specified as

g

+ f)(E, g) + a

g + k + a

where children's consumption exhausts their income, defined as the sum of
child's endowed income g (a function of genetic endowments), earnings from
human capital k, and asset income a (Tomes 1981).

Earnings are the product of

'a ·human ca.p'i'ta.1:'•¼·production function defined over a parental efficiency

. parameter f3, education E and the genetic endowment g.
The income constraint is

where income of parents , YP

is spent .on parental consumption of. goods

¾

(the numeraire), and expenditures on education and material transfers, p 9 CE
The price of education is

Pe

+

per head, C is the number of children,

and Eis educational investment per child.

With regard to asset transfers, Pa

is the price of the asset and A is the amount of assets transferred per child.
In most models which assumealtruism, a parent maximizes (1) subject to (2)
and (3) to obtain the optimal number of children and optimal investments in
human and physical capital per child.
In their model of intergenerational transfers, Behrman, Pollak and
Taubman (1982) introduce the notion for parental preferences for intersibling
equality in their choice of human capital investment and material transfers.
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They argue that parental preference leads to schooling outcomes different from
-. a .wealth ·model of investment, given differences in genetic endowments among
children.

Thus; depending ori the value of the parental preference parameter,

parents may choose investment (schooling) strategies which may reinforce,
compensate, or be neutral with respect to the child's genetic endowments.
Empirical application toa sample of adult male twins yields the result that,
parents care about offsprings' earnings inequality and provide more (less)
resources to the less (more) able than is consistent with a purely return
maximizing investment model.
In later work, Behrman et al. (1989) examine the Becker-Tomes wealth
model with equal parent concern for all children and the implications of the
availability of parental resources for human capital and financial transfers
to children.·· According .to the 'Wealth model, if parental resources are large·
enough, parents can provide each.child with the wealth maximizing level of
education and use (unequal) financial transfers to equalize present discounted
value·of children's income;

However, if parents are resource-constrained, the

wealth model implies that parents will allocate transfers unequally among
children, do not equalize the present discounted value of children's income,
and do not necessarily provide each child with the wealth-maximizing level of
education.

Behrman et al. do not find empirical evidence to support the

predictions of the wealth,model, since disinheritance and unequal sharing of
estates among siblings are not the norm in the United States.

They argue

that the Becker and Tornes model add together earnings and returns from
financial assets for each child, while their own study treats these as
separable arguments in the parents' utility function.

8

Altruistic models of family behavior have been criticized for not taking
into account nonaltruistic .motives of parents to. provide. transfers to .their,.,·
• children. 5

In exchange models of intergenerational transfers, the parental', ,.

utiiity function .is defined. over parentai consumption.and child--consumption, ..
but also includes parental consumption of child services,·the provision.of
which causes disutilityto the child. 6 ,The parent's.utility..function,is.,,,.,c,c,.

where Up, 'zp, and zc:: ·are as defined above, s is child services and V is the
. child's level of well-being, defined over zc and s.

Both parental and child,

consumption are normal goods, and 8Up/8V > 0, indicating that parents are
altruistic.

However,· while parents enjoy child services (8Up/8s ·> 0), their

provision causes disutility to the.child (8V/8s < 0).

It is over the

provision of child services that motives for transfers may depart from pure
altruism. · ·Whether or not' the parents act altruistically or strategically. is ,.
determined by the constraint

5

In the exchange model of Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers (1985), for
example, the parent makes transfers to children in return for services received
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) view the family as an incomplete
from them.
annuities market, where children make regular transfers to their parents, and
the share that each child contributes to the parents determinces his or her share
Pollak's (1988) model of tied transfers and
of the parental estate.
paternalistic preferences is midway between the altruistic and exchange models.
Pollak argues that parents care about their children's consumption even after
the children have grown up and left home, and use tied transfers to influence
the children's consumption of particular goods and services.
6

This exposition follows Cox (1987) closely.
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that is, whether the child's utility when providing services is greater than.-·
his/her reservation utility or "threat point," defined over child's income
(without transfers) and no provision of child services.

If .(5) is not.

binding, transfer behavior is altruistic and the child's gain is strictly
positive.

Otherwise,-, transfers provide compensation for child ,services,....,,.cox,

(1987) tests altruism versus exchange motives using a data set on inter-vivos
transfers for the United States.

A negative relationship between pretransfer

income and transfers suggests altruism, while a positive relationship signals
· '· •"· the ·presence'i<of-;c-,exchange motives.

His results -support the idea that inter

vivos transfers· are payments for services exchanged among family units ...
Other studies on intergenerational transfers (Cox and Jimenez 1991) have
explicitly incorporated the -,idea of bargaining between parents and children ..
Suppose that parents and children are mutually altruis_tic.
utility function is defined over own consumption

xp

The parents'

and child utility V:

and child utility is defined over child consumption and parent utility

(7) V

Assuming imperfect capital markets, a common subjective rate of time
preference, and the possibility that parents lend to children in the latter's
youth in return for transfers received in their old age, Cox and Jimenez
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(1991) suggest that the terms of the intergenerational loan are determined.by
Nash bargaining.

(8)

Parents and children choose transfers to maximize

N

where Up° and V0 are the utilities obtained by .parents and chi·ldren on their
own.

Cox and Jimenez's empirical results for urban Peru support the presence

of altruistic motives at low levels of pretransfer income and exchange motives
at higher levels of pretransfer income.
Finally, the insurance motive for wealth transfers views the family as a
means .. for diversifying against .risk.

This view is especially prevalent in the

literature on the family in developing countries.

For example, Rosenzweig

(1988) argues' that family structure and kinship ties are sustained over space
and time in implicit insurance-based schemes to smooth incomes in the face of.
covariant income risks.

Such familial transfer arrangements are preferred to

the use of credit markets, particularly· by households able to self-insure
because of their ability to accumulate wealth.

Moreover, the

intergenerationally extended nature of farm families and the prevalence of
inheritance rather than land market sales are viewed as ways of capturing
returns to specific experience by farm families (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1985).
Testing alternative models of intergenerational transfers in a
developing country will require a formulation to take into account not only
the differences in risk faced by families, but also the existence of imperfect
asset markets which may constrain the form in which wealth is held and in
which transfers are made.

The absence of a well-developed financial system

may increase the desirability of nonfinancial assets, especially land, as
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forms of transferring wealth.

In the absence of modern property _rights, or

,the existence of institutional constraints on;" these rights (such as land.
-reform laws forbidding the sale of tenancy rights), even usufruct rights. to
land acquire the status of an asset.

Children.are also viewed.as an.assetAn

rural economies; variables .positively associated with returns . to .child labor- size of landholding, agricultural .productivity,. and.,wage rates--have..been_..,
shown to be positively related to fertility and negatively related to child
schooling (Rosenzweig and Evenson 1977).
Education is another form in which parents may transfer wealth to their
·children.· 'TnY'"'developing countries, educational

investment is motivated

partly by altruism, but may also be due to the parents' desire to capture
returns to children's schooling.

Agricultural parents may want to diversify

the family's 'occupational -.portfolio .by investing· in children's education•,
since better educated 0 children have better chances of moving into a
nonagricultural occupation for which returns may covary less with agricultural
•incomes and ·thus provide insurance to smooth fluctuations· in family income.··,.
Parents in rural areas may also invest preferentially in family members (e.g.
children of the head) who have higher probabilities of making remittances from
urban incomes than other members (sons- or daughters-in law, or even spouses).
In Botswana, remittances from own young are significantly higher than among
all absentee members of the household, supporting the notion.that remittances
are partly a result of an intergenerational contract to repay initial
educational investments (Lucas and Stark 1985).
Although recent studies of intergenerational transfers have incorporated
the notion of bargaining between parents and children, they do not recognize
individualistic preferences of parents or asymmetries in parents' bargaining
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position (Manser and Brown 1981; McElroy and Horney 1981; McElroy 1990).

Most

·of the·above studies do.not distinguish,betweenutility functions.of
individual parents. · In other words, while.bargaining·between parents and
children has been admitted, these studies usually hold that ..p arents ..have.. ·
common preferences.
A number .of . studies-.,have relaxed the neoclassical assumption •,of .common
preferences between husband and wife in household decision-making.

McElroy

and Horney's (1988) Nash bargaining formulation relaxes the restriction that
nonearned incomes of husband and wife have identical effects on family labor
· sup'p'ly arid corriinodity demands; this restriction is empirically rejected for
·female·-labor supply· and.fertility in.Thailand (Schultz 1990). · Thomas (1990an·
1990b) examines the differential effects of father's and mother's endowments
on sonsand daughters'·health in the;United States;·Ghana and Brazil, ·and
points out greater impact of parents' endowments on children of the same
gender .
. It has been argued .(Chiappori 1988a, ·1988b) that the Nash-bargaining
assumption is overly restrictive and does not yield easily testable
restrictions, unless the pre-marital (indirect) utility function is known.

In

addition, McElroy and Horney assume independence of pre- and post-marital
preferences.

In consequence, unless preferences are known, Nash bargaining

implies only·Pareto optimality of·household decisions.

Thus,··one need only':,;•

assume Pareto efficiency in household allocation outcomes.

Even if the Nash

bargaining solution (if it exists) may be reached through more complicated
processes of sequential bargaining (Harsanyi and Selten 1987), one does not
need to assume a particular bargaining rule to test the common preference
model of household decision-making.

If we assume only that household
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allocations are Pareto efficient, but parents have different preferences,
household demands should _be affected only by prices and individual componentsof unearned income (Thomas 1990a).

*
That is, the optimal' household demands x-i

are:

(9)

*
Xi

where pis a vector of prices, and I 1 ,
individuals 1 tom.

... ,

Im are unearned incomes of

One can therefore test the common preference model

against a''broad-cla:ss -of alternatives by testing for the equality of unearned
income effects.
Suppose that the desired number of children, education, and transfers
•are outcomes .'of household decision making,_, and that parents have
individualistic preferences.

It is possible that these outcomes will be

affected by differences in parents' bargaining power, and that realizations
among sons and daughters will be likewise affected.

Different preferences in

intergenerational transfers to sons and daughters could then be manifested in
observed inheritance outcomes.

This paper aims to provide econometric

evidence on inheritance rules in rural Philippine households.
favored in land and asset inheritance?

Are male heirs

Do differences in father's and

mother's individual endowments and child characteristics affect household
allocation decisions among sons and daughters?

If daughters are not favored

in land inheritance, are other forms of transfers (schooling or assets) meant
to offset this bias?
the paper.

We attempt to answer these questions in the remainder of
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2.2

The Model

·Consider·.an,,·agricultural;.household:.with,'two ,adult members (parents);,,..,.,..
0

Parents decide on the desired number of children and levels of education and

0

,

asset transfers to them. ,We,assume individualistic ,preferences--the-,..father .,
and mother have their own utility functions--and individual sources of
unearned·income;

The, demand for· goods, leisure, ,the .desired •number. of

children and optimal levels of education and asset transfers can be expressed
as:

(10a)

Xi

*

x\'(p,

w f•

*

*
Wm• L, If, Im )

. (10b)

1*i

l\(p,

w*f•

*
Wm• L, If, Im )

(10c)

c*

(10d)

E*

(lOe)

A*

=,

c*(p,

w*f•

*
Wm• L, If, Im )

E*(p,

w*f•

*
Wm• L, If, Im )

A*(p,

w*f•

*
Wm• L, If, Im )

where pis a vector of prices of consumption goods, including the cost of
education

Pe

and assets

Pa,

*
wi

of fixed inputs, such as land, and
father and mother respectively. 7

is the shadow wage rate, Lis a vector
are unearned incomes of

If

The shadow wage rate is endogenously

determined by market prices, fixed inputs, and unearned income.

Wages are

endogenous because of the possibility-that an individual may.not participate·
in the wage labor market.

7

Since the

w* i

are endogenous, appropriate

Although area cultivated can be considered a choice variable in any
cropping season, we assume that the landholding size (including cultivated and
fallow land) is largely determined at the time of marriage, since farming
households typically receive land rights as a marriage gift from parents, or
enter into tenancy contracts prior to setting up a separate household.
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.instruments must be found for them; candidates are parents' previous
-·investment · in human• capital,·(cornpleted,schooling) ;,"/.individual unearned--incorne·
or indicators thereof, such as individual land or asset ownership.
Theoretically, the optimal quantities are derivedfrornsolving·the
Hicksian demand functions simultaneously, given prices, virtual wages,
unearned income, and .fixed inputs. .• In practice, however, · due·• to the
sequential nature of decision-making over the life cycle, later decisions may
be based on previous decisions, plus the realization of "luck" or deviations
from the expected outcome.

This added error, or changes in the initial

conditions, could lead to a revision of earlier goals.

For example, in the

typical .family life. cycle, .completed fertility. is determined prior to the
completion of investment in children's human capital; schooling may also be
completed before the child's earning .capacity. is known '(Tornes 1981).

Given.

that, at the time bequests are made, parents' fertility is predetermined and
human capital investment already precornrnitted, no adjustment of these choice·
variables may be possible, so material transfers-.will have to adjust if
decisions are revised.
Thus, let us assume that parents decide completed family size in family
j using the rule

(11)

c*.J

where

a

is a vector of other variables, such as parental tenure, irrigation,

or location.

Educational investment in child i of family j will then take

into account the number of children
parameter

f)j:

c*.J

as well as the parental efficiency

16

w *f,

*
Wm•

and asset transfers, in- turn-, will be· conditioned on the number· of·thildrerr~·-·
c*j

and previous investment in their human capital E\j:

C* j '

w * f•

In practice,

C*j ,

E*ij,

and

A\j

are all affected by the same

·unobservables/· such as-preferences, and could have common error components.
It is-.difficulL to .find variables which would affect some of the. decisions...,,,
exclusively in order to impose identifying restrictions.

For example, it

·_·---could~-he-ar-gued-c.-that~parentsc:"may+grant_:s malle.L'heque.sts'--to--'--childr_en_:who.::dllarr,¥-·--
weal thier spouses.

But to the extent that family formation is an endogenous

process and depends on individual characteristics such as marital
attractiveness and educational attainment (Boulier and Rosenzweig 1984),

··~

spousal characteristics or even child's marital status is not exogenous. 8
Even the provision of child services is not independent of previous parental
decisions; better educated children may be more able to provide old age
support, or children not in the labor market may have more time to spend
visiting parents.

If one assumes that previous levels are predetermined and:

that errors are not correlated across equations, then the model can be

8

In the rural Philippines, for example, marriage partners are chosen to a
great extent with an eye for equivalent or higher status. The institution of
the salonson (formal marriage proposal in Pangasinan) is purely a meeting for
economic bargaining between parents before marriage plans are allowed to proceed
further. Land rights may be withheld by parents if they disapprove of a son's
choice of bride (Anderson 1962: 54).
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estimated recursively.

Alternatively, one can estimate reduced form equations

and express family outcomes .as. a function. mainly of .·parental, characteristics
at the time of marriage.

Weuse the second method, but also include a vector

of child characteristics such as gender, birth year, dummies.for eldest or
youngest child, and interactions between gender and birth order.
2.3

Empirical Specification

We assume that parents can transfer wealth through human capital
investment (education), land rights (usufruct rights or land ownership), and
nonland assets. 9

The reduced form equations are expressed as a function of

parental endowments in·the fertility equation and of both parent endowments
and child,characteristics in the education, .land, and.nonland asset transfer
equations.
The fertility equation can be written .as

c*

(14)

where c*

is completed ·family size, defined as number of children ever born ... ,

minus child deaths below age five, and

Xf

and

x.ii are vectors of parental

endowments at the time of marriage, such as education,

size of land owned,

and area cultivated or joint landholding at the time of marriage.

We study

completed family size rather than number of children ever born because we are

9

Most of these are inter-vivos transfers, since parents usually transfer the
land right to their children while the former are still living, usually when the
child gets married. Single children generally claim their rights only after the
final division of the estate; i.e. after their parents' death, since they
continue to live in the parental household while unmarried. The exception occurs
if the child worked in a distant location. In their old age, however, parents
usually stay with the youngest child, who then inherits the parental house.
Since bestowal of land rights is linked to marriage, it can be argued that the
decision to marry may be motivated partly by the desire to realize claims to
land.
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unable to measure confidently child mortality and replacement fertility with
our data.

Individual landownership is our~indicator of individual asset

positions, because area cultivated exclusively by women.is not common in the.
·Philippines, but landownership by women is widespread.

Area cultivated-at.the

time of marriage, on the other hand, is a measure of .family income.generating
capacity in agriculture. .Lastly, since we are .looking at a sample whose
family sizes have been completed by the time of the survey ( the youngest
child in the sample was born in 1980), we do not include mother's age as a
regressor to take into account differential fertility across age cohorts.

A

linear·tren:d·across"cohorts in completed fertility is captured by mother's
year of birth.
Level Estimates.
Education and wealth.,transfer. decisions involve not only parental
endowments but also child characteristics and their interaction with parental
endowments ..· Thus, we specify the levels of education, land and assets
received by child i in family j as:

(15)

E*ij

el

+

ezXeij

+ e3Xfj

+

(16)

L*ij

11

+

lzXeij

+ l3Xfj

(17)

A*ij

al

+

azXeij

+ a3Xfj

where

Xe

+ esXfjXeij

+ e6~jxeij

+

€2

+ 14~j

+

lsXfjXeij

+ 16~jxeij

+

€3

+ a4~j

+ asXfjXeij

+ a6~jxeij

+

€4

e4~j

is a vector of child characteristics such as gender, birth year,

and dummies for the eldest or youngest child, and
interaction terms for child gender and
child,

j indexes the family, and <:i

XfXe

and

Ve

are

parent endowments, i indexes the

is the error term in each equation.
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Birth year is included as an explanatory variable to account for possible time
trends in environmental conditions, such as the availability of education.'·
Family Fixed Effect Specification.
Level estimatesdo'not adequately capture·the effects of family level
variables that may influence the capacity of parents to transfer assets.to
Aside from endowments at,the time of marriage, assets

their children.

accumulated by the couple over their adult life cycle would affect their
ability to make bestowals.
are not observed.

However, many of these family-specific variables

Should these omitted family level variables be correlated

with those'included,in the previous model, their estimated effects on
•. transfers may be biased.

For those families with at least two children, the

within family allocation may be the critical source of variation in the sample
from which to estimate gender differences in transfers. 10
Consequently, we adopt a fixed effect specification that includes a
family "effect".

One way of accounting for family fixed effects is to

introduce dummy variables for those omitted variables that are specific to
each family. 11

An equivalent method is to estimate the slope parameters using

first differences in the dependent and explanatory variables.

We simply

compute the means of the individual observations for each family unit,
transform the observed variables by subtracting out the family means Yj and Xj
for the dependent and independent variables, respectively, and apply least
squares to the transformed data.

In this specification, the effect of family

10

We choose families with at least two children of both sexes so that
eldest, youngest, and gender dummies are relevant in the family fixed effects
specification.
11

See Hsiao (1986: 29-31) for a more detailed exposition.
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variables that do not vary across children cannot be identified, such as
parent endowments at marriage or residential location.

However, the effects

of these variables may be estimated to the· extent-. that· they impact differently
on children of different ,gender. Thus, in our specific application, •:only the ·
child's gender, eldest and youngest dummies, interaction between child gender
and birth order, ·the child gender and parent endowment interaction ·.terms;· and
the birth year difference ( difference between the child's birth year and the
average birth year within the family) remain as explanatory variables in the
family fixed effects specification.

3.

An Application to the Philippines
3.1

Data

Data were obtained from- a retrospective survey of 344 sample households
in five selected villages, which were randomly selected and intensively
surveyed by the International Rice Research Institute (IRR!) in 1985. 12

A

complete village census was initially conducted in 1984 to obtain general

,.

information on farm and household characteristics, demographic data, migration
histories, and changes in tenancy and landownership status.

A sample survey

of farming and landless households was then conducted twice, pertaining to the
dry (January to May) and wet (June to December) seasons of 1985.

The sample

households were selected from the population list stratified by migration
status and farm size for farm households and by migration status and family
size for landless households.

Although the choice of stratification variables

is debatable, this study resurveyed the sample as it was initially surveyed by

12

Results of the survey on rice production and income distribution are
reported by Otsuka, Cordova and David (1990).
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IRRI. 13

The 1985 IRRI sample consisted of 300 farming households and 96

landless households; due to outmigration the sample size was reduced to 344 as
of 1989 . 14

·

Since the initial survey focused on rice farming practices,· heads

of households (usually· male) were chosen ·as respondents; --this···may··have -led'•to
a larger number of observations on males compared to females in the 1989 ..
survey. ,The retrospectivesurvey·included questions on the .parents,.siblings,
and children of the respondents, yielding information on three generations
which we term the parents', children's and grandchildren's generations.

The

survey enable us to match 331 sets of parents with 2241 offspring for the
'chi'ldren'''s·'gerreration·),~· Familiarity of the enumerators with the sample
· •respondents -and .their, spouses. established· through repeated interviews greatly,i
facilitated the resurvey in 1989.
Two villages are located in.Central Luzon, while three villages are in
Panay Island.

These villages are typical rice growing villages in these

regions, and the whole area is planted to rice during the wet season (June ·to
December).

Rice cultivation during the dry season depends on the availability

of irrigation.

Cropping patterns, irrigation facilities, tenure distribution,

13

Migration and family size are inappropriate stratifying variables since
both are endogenous to family decisions. To some extent, since farm size may
be limited by land reform regulations, this may be considered exogenous, although
informal land pawning agreements may change actual area cultivated in a given
season. It is perhaps more accurate to state that land legally acquired through
land reform is subject to award limits and is exogenous.
14

No attempt was made to replace respondents because we wanted to match
present respondents with previously collected records on family histories.
1

5we only
the nature of
to recall some
out on set of

included observations for which information was complete. Due to
the retrospective survey, it was difficult for some respondents
of the information being requested. Estimation was also carried
smaller subsamples; this will be discussed later in the text.
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and modes of land acquisition are discussed in greater detail in the
Appendix.
A summary of family,' parent,· and child characteristics·, classified-by,,
father's tenure status at marriage ,is presented- in Table· l. , -Completed family
size in the children's generation is 6.72, with mean.birth year.in.1940 ..

The

implied sex ratio of 1. 27 ·suggests that· more'· sons than daughters are ·•
represented, and could be due to the choice of the household head (usually
male) as respondent in the IRRI survey.

On the average, fathers owned 1.42

hectares at the time of marriage; mothers, 0.58 hectares.

The average size of

joint laridholdihg ''at '-the time of marriage, 3. 46 hectares, is larger than the
sum of-,,father' s and .mother's owned· land because, of tenancy agreements . 16

On,

the average, fathers tend to be better educated than mothers, with 3.69 and
3. 16 years of schooling, respectively.. , This ..-trend is reversed in •the, next ,
generation, where daughters have 7.01 years of schooling and sons, only 6.54
years.

The gain in female education (daughter's education minus mother's

education) is larger than the corresponding gain for males in-all tenure
categories.
Sons receive almost twice the area bestowed to daughters (0.42 hectares,
compared to 0.22 hectares).

16

The value of land inherited is also higher for

Seventy-five percent of fathers and twenty-five percent of mothers had
individual rights to owned land. In many cases, howeveer, owned land was in the
respective., parents'. provinces of origin and not. in, the ,survey area.
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sons than for daughters. 17

Sons also receive a higher value of nonland assets

and of inherited assets. 18
Means and standard deviations ·of the variables used in the ,regressions
are presented in Table 2. ,.For the levels estimates;·. estimation was· performed
on a smaller sample of 2212 individuals belonging to families with at least
two children, of which 1366 belonged to families which had bestowed land to at

17

Land values for different tenure categories were computed using 1989
prices. Prices of owned land are readily available. Prices for other tenure
categories are obtained from informal transactions for usufruct mortgage (land
pawning) ,> since ·existing land reform laws restrict- the sale and transfer of
cultivation rights.
A comprehensive land reform program in rice and corn areas was implemented
by virtue of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, promulgated in 1972. Share tenants
on land greater than seven hectares in size were allowed to purchase the land
they cultivated (subject to award limits) through amortization payments based
on the value of- crop production to .the Land· Bank of the. Philippines. .·$hare
tenants on ,land less.,than seven hectares in size were converted to fixed-rent
leaseholders; the rent was based on 25 percent of the output, net of customary
expenses, as of 1972. Under this program, land rights for the former category
of tenants were formalized in Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT), which are
transferable only by hereditary succession or to the government through the
Department ·of- Agrarian Reform (DAR) ·(Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano 1990)'.
Leasehold rights, however, can be sold with the approval of the landowner and
the local DAR office. Despite these laws, there is a growing, albeit illegal,
market for cultivation rights through land pawning arrangements (Nagarajan,
Quisumbing and Otsuka 1990).
Using pawn-out value as an indicator of the
implicit market price of a tenancy right, we found that in the Central Luzon
villages in 1989, the price of a share tenancy right was, on the average,
approximately equal to the pawning price of leasehold land, but the pawning price
of CLT land was approximately twice that of leasehold land. In the Panay Island
villages, which have a mix of tenant and owner-cultivators, the price of title
sale is from two to five times the pawning price.
18

Nonland assets are valued in 1989 prices. For assets whose present values
were declared by the respondent, these present values were used. Asset values
for which only values at bestowal were available were inflated to 1989 values
using the farm gate rice price index for farm animals, farm assets, on- farm
residential house and lot, or a region-specific consumer price index (CPI) for
readily tradeable consumer durables.
Since mobility and fungibility of farm
· assets is limited, and ·the value of farm property linked to returns to rice
production, the rice price index is thought to be a better adjustment factor than
the CPI.
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.least one child.

Families with less than two children were excluded since the

eldest and youngest dummies would not apply.

For the fixed effects estimates,

single""gender families were excluded; this reduced the sample size to 2083
individuals.
3.2

Estimation

Ordinary least squares estimates for the fertility'equation.are·
presented in Table 3.

Completed (surviving) family size, defined as number of

children ever born minus child deaths below age five, is regressed on mother's
birth year, father's and mother's education,
·,,s:

father's and mother's land

own:ed,<'and•joitrt··"l:andholding at the time of marriage.

A female respondent

dummy.was included to control for differential recall by gender of respondent.
The results of the fertility equation are disappointing:

none of the

·coefficients are statistically:.csignificant at the :5% level, and the overall
regression is statistically insignificant at the 5% level.

Only the

coefficients for mother's birth year and education are significantly different
from zero at the 10% level, with the latter being negative.

We are therefore

led to conclude that, for this generation, fertility behavior is random. 19
Table 4 presents OLS estimates of children's educational levels,
stratified according to the family's land inheritance status, i.e., whether or
not parents bestowed land to at least one child, which is taken as exogenous
in this study. 2

°

Children's years of schooling is regressed on parental

19

To some extent, this could be due to respondents' difficulty in recalling
earlier births and parental characteristics. Preliminary results indicate that
fertility behavior of the next generation is highly responsive to the same
economic variables.
20

Parents' probability of bestowing land is strongly affected by exogenous
variables which·are given at the time of marriage. Father's and mother's land
owned (or landholding at marriage, in an alternative specification) are
statistically significant in a probit .regression of.. the probability that parents
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characteristics (father's and mother.' s education and landownership), child ., "
characteristics (gender, birth year, and dummies for the eldest and youngest
child), interaction between child gender and birth order terms, and
' 'Interaction, terms,. for ,child ·gender···and' parental endowments. 21 · 'To' control···for
differential recall by respondents of their own schooling and transfer levels
··. relative to their. siblings, a respondent dummy is included; differential
recall by female respondents is controlled for through a female respondent
dummy. 22
For the entire sample, including the full range of interactions, the
coefficient o'f ·~hild' s ·birth year is positive and significant while the
·,quadratic .in.bir.th year .(divided by 1000), is significant and negative,
indicating secular increases in schooling at a diminishing rate.
child is weakly favored in -terms ,.of,,.education.

.,

The youngest

·Both father's and mother's

education and mother's land owned are positively and significantly associated
with child.schooling.

However, likelihood ratio tests for the joint

significance of gender interactions lead us to accept the null hypothesis that
gender-birth-order interactions are insignificant, and that all gender
interactions (with birth order and parent endowments) are equal to zero.

We

bestow land to at least one child (Table A.4, in the Appendix). Although it is
conceivable that parents may accumulate land in the hope of making bequests to
Share tenants were
their children, this is constrained by land reform laws.
allowed to receive a maximum of three hectares of irrigated land or five hectares
of unirrigated land. There is, however, no constraint to the purchase of owned
land.
21

So that the eldest and youngest dummies would be relevant, families with
less than two children were excluded. This reduced the number of individuals
in the sample from 2241 to 2212, and the number of families from 331 to 307.
22

This is an effort to account for respondent-related measurement errors.
An attempt was made to interact child gender with the gender of the respondent,
but this. led to multicollinearity ..among regressors.
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do reject the null hypothesis that gender-parental interaction effects are
equal to zero (

x2

= 21. 76).

There is some weak evidence (at 10%) that

better educated fathers tend to favor·sons, while land-owning mothers favor·
daughters .:<-We'weakl-y ,rej ect·the,nulb hypothesis-ithat··gender 'interactions with
0

0

parents' education are equal (F=2.77), that interactions between gender and
landownership equal (F=2.55), and that parental interaction effects a
equal (F=3.10).

The respondent dummy is insignificant but the female

respondent dummy is significant and positive.
The effects of different resource availabilities can be discerned by
coinpatirig ''families with·,land bequests, which presumably have more resources,
to ;families which.are•unable to make land bequests.· While the birth year
coefficient is significant and positive, and the quadratic term significantly
.· negative, for both -subsamples,, there: is '.weak. evidence· that daughters receive
less education in the sample with land bequests.
modified by the positive

•.c:,

This result is somewhat

(though weakly significant at.10%) coefficient of

the female-birth year interaction, which may indicate better education for
later-born females.

However, these results should be taken with caution since

for both types of families, we accept the null hypotheses that (1) gender
birth order interactions are equal to zero, and (2) that all gender
interactions are equal to zero.

The coefficients of father's and mother's

education are significant and positive for the sample with land bequests,
while that of father's land owned is significant and positive for both
subsamples.

It is interesting to note that area cultivated at marriage exerts

a negative though weak effect on schooling levels, which could reflect higher
opportunity costs of schooling due to the demand for on-farm family labor.
This is consistent with evidence from India (Rosenzweig and Evenson 1977)
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.which suggests a negative relationship between size of landholding and child
There is weak evidence that daughters of better.educated mothers

schooling.

receive more schooling in the sample without land bequests;
.\ >;,:"

However,,this "

does·· not> necessarily?·ref-lect·,only,;;;parental:Jgender.,pre ference:,:;:i:butiimartindic-at:e
technological differences in the household division of labor since mothers'

· occupations. may benefit from better trained daughters. 23

We reject the null·

hypothesis that gender-parental interaction terms are equal to zero only for
the sample with land bequests.

For the entire sample and the subsample

without land bequests, we reject the null hypothesis that gender interactio
.,,effects with parents ,,·education are equal (F=2. 77; F= -2 .10), and for the
• -entire,·,sample :we..reject the. equality· of parental landownership interaction---·""'
terms (F=2.55) and of-both education and landownership interaction terms
(F=3.10).
Differences across siblings within the same family are analyzed using
family fixed effects estimates; with a.complete set of gender interactions·
(Table >5) . 24

·

For the entire sample and the families which

make land

bequests, the dummy.for the eldest child is positive and that for the youngest
negative.

These coefficients are weakly different from each other; F

statistics are 2.82 and 4.96, for the two sample categories, respectively.

In

the sample without land bestowal, later-born female children are favored with

23

Anthropological evidence also suggests that daughters not only act as
mother-surrogates if the latter is absent or feeble, but have strong
responsibilities toward their mothers. A daughter has an obligation to provide
moral and financial support for her mother, and even when married, a daughter
commonly attends to her mother's needs first (Nurge 1965: 102; quoted in Lopez
1991: 18).
24

Single-gender families and families with less than two children were
excluded. Tbe. sample size for the .fixed effects estimation .is 2083.
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.respect to education, although if the youngest is female, she appears to
receive less education than ·her siblings.·· ,The strongest and most consistent>
effects, however,- are for· birth year·. differences.

Later born children receive

-. :better :•than·average.·.educatio n··within .the,..fami1y. ':,Respondents~~owho.care,cchy:;,y.;<'i'.'
sample design, usually involved in agricultural production, have significantly
lower levels of education than the sibling average.

The above .results must.be

qualified, however, since tests for the joint significance of gender
interaction terms lead to the acceptance of the null hypotheses that (1)
gender-birth order effects are insignificant (except for the sample without
' land 'bestowa'l")

0

;,:··(

2} ,gender-parental interaction terms are equal to zero; and

(3) alLgender,.interaction s .are .equaLto zero ... In:the ...whole, sample and . , the....,~.
sample with land bestowal, we reject the null hypothesis for equality of
eldest and youngest'children ,,in -education (F=2. 82 and F=4. 96, respectively);
for the latter subsample, we weakly reject the equality of gender-birth order
interaction terms (F=2.58).
Having rejected the joint significance of the gender interaction terms,
we reestimate the model as a function purely of child characteristics and
In level terms, daughters are clearly favored

parent endowments (Table 6).
with respect to education.

Educational levels increase secularly at a

diminishing rate, and there is weak evidence to support that the youngest
child may receive more education, a reversal of the results mentioned above.
Both parents' levels of schooling exert positive and significant effects, and
mother's education has a stronger effect on child's education, regardless of
the gender of the child.

We reject the null hypotheses that parents'

education effects are equal (F= 2.94 for the whole sample; F= 2.49 for the
sample without land bestowal).

Education is also positively related to
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,parents' landownership, although both effects are statistically equal.

In the

sample without landbestowal,:-·area cultivated exerts a negative influence-on<
children's education, possibly due to competing demands for children's•· time.
When'we take' into account family fixed effects 'without. the :gender."intera:ction
terms (Table 7), the two variables which remain significant are the birth year
difference (positive) .and the respondent dummy (negative),

,The. female.dummy

is insignificant.
We examine determinants of the levels of land and nonla:nd asset
transfers in families which make land transfers to at least one heir, with all
;,_:igender<interac1ti'ons· included (Table 8).

None of the child characteristics,

.
except _.for. the positive and significant eldest . female

dummy, ,,,is a significant-

determinant of the value of land received by heirs.

In contrast, some

parental chatacte:fistics ~a.riff most -ofc:the gender;;parent endowment int:etacfion
terms significantly affect land bestowal levels.

Mother's education has a.

significant and negative effect on land bestowals, while area cultivated at
·marriage has a significantly positive effect.

The latter probably indicates a

larger area of land to divide among children and would thus be positively
associated with land transfer levels.

Differential effects of parental

endowments by child gender are more obvious from examination of the
interaction terms.

Better educated fathers tend to give land to boys, while

better educated mothers favor girls.
give land to girls.
give land to sons.

Land-owning fathers and mothers tend to

Families with larger cultivated areas, however, tend to
This supports anthropological evidence (Takahashi 1969;

Umehara 1974) that among land-owning families, both sons and daughters inherit
land, while among tenant families (who do not own land but cultivate rented
land) tenancy rights are bestowed to male heirs.

We reject the equality of
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(1) parents' education effects, (2) parents' landownership effects, and (3)
both education and landownership effects ....Moreover, we reject the .equality of
gender-parental education effects and the equality of both sets of parental
interaction terms.
Younger children tend to get lower levels of nonland asset transfers,
although if the youngest child is female, she receives higher levels of
nonland assets.

This may be due to the cultural expectation for the youngest

child, especially if she is a daughter, to care for the parents in their old
age.

The youngest child usually receives the parental home as a bequest.

, Mother'•s.··education'and-·father's and mother's owned land have negative
coefficients, but area cultivated is a significant and .positive .determinant o.f
nonland asset transfers.

Better educated fathers and land-owning fathers tend

.to give nonland assets to•daughters

although families who cultivate larger
0

areas may give nonland assets to sons, possibly because of complementarity
between farm assets and land bestowed .
.. Levels of total .inheritance appear to be .weakly higher for daughters .but
lower for younger children.

Later-born daughters, however, appear to receive

lower values of total inheritance.

Mother's education is negatively related

to total value of inheritance, but larger areas cultivated positively affect
the total value of inheritance a child can receive.

Sons of better educated

fathers and daughters of better educated mothers receive larger total
bestowals.

Land-owning fathers and mothers bestow higher values of inherited

wealth to daughters, though the latter are at a disadvantage in families which
cultivate large areas.
all equations.

The respondent dummy is significant and positive in
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In contrast to the education equations,

we reject the null hypotheses

that the gender interactions are .jointly,Sequal ·to zero.

In all· three.

equations, we reject the null hypotheses that (1) gender-parental interaction
-effects are equal to zero; .and (2). that alL gender,. interaction:;, effe·ct.s:. are:., •,<
equal to zero.

However, we can reject the hypothesis that gender-birth order

effects are equal to zero only in the land value equation.

In .the other .

equations, we accept the null hypotheses that these effects are equal to zero
-birth order interactions do not seem to be important determinants of nonland
assets and total value of inheritance.
·,:

We also reject the hypotheses that (1)

·"parent~t••te'ducf:rti:on'•-effects are equal in all equations; (2) parents'
· .. landownership ..effects are equal in the land and. total inheritance equations; "'
(3) parental effects are jointly equal in the land and total inheritance
equations; (4) parental education interactions are equal; and (5) both types
of parental interaction terms are equal.

Parental landownership interactions

with gender are equal, lending support to anthropological findings on transfer
behavior by landowning families.
When we account for family fixed effects (Table 9), the bias against
daughters in land inheritance becomes evident.

While other child

characteristics are insignificant, the female dummy is significant and
negative.
land.

Daughters of better educated mothers, however, tend to receive more

Daughters and later-born children also receive more nonland assets,

although the youngest child is not especially favored, unless it is a
daughter.

Surprisingly, the coefficients for later born daughters and eldest

female children are negative.

Daughters in families cultivating larger areas

tend to receive less nonland assets compared to the sibling average.
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The bias against females persists when we examine differences in total
inheritance value.

·Females, especially younger females, receive less

inheritance than their siblings.
· - ii<-

Better educated fathers favor sons, while

landowning ,,mothers- .favor: daughters; ·. The:'respondent,dummy ,is 0-,significant -'and\:·
positive, which may indicate either that the respondent has received more
relative to his siblings, or that respondent recall.for his own receipts is
more accurate.

In contrast to the level estimates, we can reject the null

hypothesis that gender-birth order effects are equal to zero only in the
nonland asset equation, and that all gender interactions are equal to zero in
the>same•e·quati:on;··• ·We reject the null hypotheses that eldest daughters and
·,,:•,~·-:Younges.t.,daughters .. are.. ,treated. equally in.,nonland .. asset bequests . . We also ... ,.:,,
reject the hypotheses that (1) child gender interaction terms with parents'
education are equal;·;and (2) both,child gender-parental interaction effects
are equal.
Since gender-interaction effects are significant in the levels
equations, we- do not reestimate these, without the,. interactions.

We present

,;cc.

the results of the family fixed effects estimates without the gender
interactions in Table 10.

Relative to sibling means, female children receive

significantly less in terms of land value.

The eldest child also receives

more than the average, although this coefficient is not significantly
different from that for the youngest child.

Nonland asset bestowal seems to

be neutral with respect to gender, although the eldest child does not appear
to be favored.

Finally, daughters receive less total inheritance relative to

sibling averages.

The respondent dummy is significant and positive in all

equations, and there is no significant difference between eldest and youngest
children in any of the equations.
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4.

Summary and Conclusions
Intergenerational wealth transfers by households in rice-growing

,, ·:villages·· were modeled "as.· the: outcome ,,of:. bargaining··,betweem,parents:.··~·,,Empirical.
results support previous findings that differences in parents' bargaining
positions--indicated by education and landownership--have .significant·
consequences on intergenerational transfers to children.

Coefficients of

father's and mother's education are significantly different from each other in
the education, land, and nonland asset transfer equations, while coefficients
of father:' s and :mother's landownership are significantly different from each
other.in land and.total .inheritance equations.
We summarize our findings by focusing on two dimensions of
intrahousehold differences in wealth transfers: (1) differences between sons
and daughters; and (2) interactions between parental characteristics and child
gender.

Our findings are remarkably consistent with the anthropological

• literature and field studies on inheritance in the lowland· Philippines

· ,,

(Anderson 1962; Scheans 1965; Takahashi 1969; Umehara 1974; Lewis 1971).
Despite Philippine laws which stipulate equal inheritance by sex, there
are marked differences in transfers towards sons and daughters.

In absolute

(level) terms, daughters receive more education and total inheritance but less
land.

In terms of deviations from the sibling mean, however, education is

neutral with respect to gender, nonland asset transfers weakly favor
daughters, while sons get more land and higher values of total inheritance.
The preference for sons in land bestowal can be attributed to the custom of
giving a portion of the parents' holdings to their son, or sons, when they got
married (Umehara 1974).

The Ilocanos, who account for a majority of
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respondents in the Central Luzon villages, subscribe to the custom of the male
land dowry (sabong) whereby parents bestow land (or a tenancy right) to the ,
son upon marriage, with the understanding that he will take care of his
p·arents in their old age. •· Land ,bestowals ·~are-' almost··exclusive:Ly··to ''sons :in""'."''
Ilocano tenant families, though males and females usually inherit equal .shares
in landowning- families (Takahashi 1969; ., Umehara· 1974) . 25

Land bestowals to

->.;

son may reflect higher returns to specific experience for boys (Rosenzweig and
Wolpin 1985), since rice farming is more intensive in male labor.
To highlight the differential effects of parent endowments and birth
order by child gender, we summarize the gender interaction terms in Table 11.
~-,,"In, generaL,,. gender-,interactions with' birth, order·- are ~insignificant:; .·, except in•

land bestowal, where the eldest daughter may receive a higher level of land
transfers.

Gender- interactions are relatively unimportant determinants of

educational levels, although they are significant in bestowals of nonhuman
capital.

In most cases, child gender interacts significantly with parent

- ··endowments. · These interactions· are most obvious in' the equations for nonhuman
,.. capital .transfers; where daughters of better educated mothers, land-owning

fathers, and land-owning mothers receive higher levels of land and nonland
assets.

25

On the other hand, better educated fathers and families with larger

There is actually wide variation in land inheritance practices among
lowland Filipinos.
In our Panay Island villages, for example, daughters also
inherit tenancy rights, as documented in Ledesma (1982).
Even among the
Ilocanos, both primogeniture and ultimogeniture have been observed. It has been
suggested that the availability of land determines the actual practice in a
community. In areas like Ilocos Norte where land pressures are extreme, parents
postpone giving land to the older son at marriage, and use the land to finance
him and others to migrate abroad.
This leaves the land in the hands of the
youngest son.
In areas· like Isabela where frontier areas are available, the
oldest gets the largest share of land, encouraging younger sons to open up new
farmlands from surrounding forests (Lews 1971: 92).
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,areas cultivated tend to bestow preferentially to sons.

The finding that

gender interactions are relatively unimportant in educational choices, and
that females receive more education, suggests that educational investment in
girls may serve to offset the bias against·daughters in land and total
inheritance.
Trend analysis of levels of transfers also indicates that education may
become more prevalent as a means for intergenerational transfers by rural
households.

Figures 2 and 3 present predicted values of education and

nonhuman capital transfers, respectively, evaluated at the means of the
.. ;.indepEihderit''Vari'ables·r ·with varying birth year. 26

Educational levels rise

..through time, ,.hut levels. of. land and. nonland asset .transfers. per child
decline.

This reflects not only secular improvements in the school system,

particularly in the postwar era,·but, more·importantly, the increased
desirability of education as nonagricultural employment opportunities expanded
and population pressure on limited ,land led to diminishing farm sizes. 27 ·. The,
.increased attractiveness of nonagricultural. occupations and.more binding land
constraints led to a revision of parents' choices of transfers to children.

26

Education levels were predicted without gender interactions terms using
the coefficients in Table 6; land, asset, and total inheritance were predicted
using the tobit estimates with interaction terms (Table 8).
27

After the 1950s, the appearance of import-substituting manufacturing
industries, mostly near Manila, was accompanied by the urbanization of the
population and a shift of the labor force from agriculture.
Although labor
absorption in industry was constrained by relatively capital-intensive
technology, the urban sector continued to attract migrants, many of whom were
absorbed in the services sector. At the same time, the exhaustion of frontier
land in the late 1950s and the acceleration of population growth after World War
II ended the traditional pattern of agricultural growth based on expansion of
·cultivated area. ,,.Instead;, subsequent increases in growth were due to increases
in productivity attributed to multiple cropping and the adoption of the modern
seed~fertilizer technology (International Labor Office, 1974).
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Thus, after the 1950s, the cost of an education for a nonagricultural (usually
civil service) position became the substitute for a farm, and in the
calculation of property division for inheritance and in arranged marriage
/:-:-, ·.· ,,negotiations, the.extent to which .,a•child•, orc,suitor' s '·-life-,c],1-an:ces:1:had,::beew.:;,;,,,
provided for by expenditure on education became a valid consideration-(Fegan
1982:119).
These inheritance rules observed in rice farming communities have
implications on intrafamily and intergenerational inequality.

In terms of

household formation and bargaining power within marriage, within agricultural
·:\communities\·'the•'•bias~•'against women in land inheritance would create a
,disadvantage ,in ,terms .of .asset -.position, .unless this,, is .compensated,by, higher;"
human

capital investment.
While our results suggest that daughters receive more education while

sons get more land, .tests -of parental preferences for equal concern should
involve comparable units .of measurement;. For human capital to be regarded on
a par with land and other assets; estimates ,,of the• discounted value .-of, returns
to education must be made and risk assessment performed.

This would require

the estimation of wage and earnings functions for men and women in both
agricultural and nonagricultural occupations from other data sources.
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APPENDIX
This data appendix provides a more detailed description of the study
·•. villages, and is taken fromNagarajan,•·Quisumbing·and·Otsuka···(l990) '.n•.,"'·.';•.'''·
Two villages are located in Central Luzon, whereas three villages are.in
Panay Island (see Fig. 1).

In the· _Central .Luzon villages, large ·rice ,hacien

das of more than a hundred hectares existed before the 1972 land reform.

On

the other hand, in the three villages in Panay Island, called Pl, P2, and P3,
landlords are only small to medium landowners.
-< · -Thes'e five,·vil1ages are typical rice growing villages in Central Luzon
0

and Panay Island, respectively, and the whole area is planted to rice during
the wet season (June to December).

Table A.1 shows the number of sample

farmers, average farm size, and technology characteristics in rice farming by
village in 1985.

The average farm size was substantially larger in the

Central Luzon villages than in the Panay Island villages.

CLl and Pl are

fully irrigated by well-maintained.gravity irrigation systems, whereas·CL2 and
P2 are characterized by shallow, favorable rainfed conditions commonly found
in the country.

P3 is also rainfed but is located in the most unfavorable

mountainous environment, which is prone to drought.

Modern rice varieties

(MVs) were fully adopted in CLl, CL2 and Pl, whereas traditional varieties
(TVs) were planted in the hilly part of P2 and the mountainous part of P3
during the wet season. 28
were grown.

Double cropping of rice was practiced by several farmers in CL2

using irrigation pumps.
28

In the irrigated villages, more than two rice crops

With shorter growth duration of MVs and more even

According to a recent study of MV adoption in the Philippines by David and
Otsuka (1990), MVs have been almost fully adopted both in irrigated and shallow
rainfed areas.
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rainfall patterns in Panay Island, two crops of rice were grown under rainfed
conditions in some parts of· P2 and P3.

Because of non-photo sensitivity of

MVs, all rice varieties grown as second and third crops were MVs.

Reflecting

.the differential adoption of- MVs and different 'production senvironments, <cs 7::, : •. ,-' '·?

·

average yield per hectare.was significantly higher in the irrigated than in
rainfed villages, particularly the most unfavorable village P3.
Before the land reform program initiated in 1972, most farmers were
share tenants in the Central Luzon villages, whereas both share tenants and
owner-cultivators coexisted in the Panay Island villages.

Table A.2 shows the

to a relatively thorough implementation,of land reform, share tenancy had
almost disappeared in CLl and CL2.

Share tenancy persisted in Pl and P2, even

though many share tenants had been-converted to leaseholders.

In contrast,

share tenancy was still very common in P3, where practically no land reform
was implemented.

An important finding from Table A.2 is that areas under

paWI)ing contract ..(usufruct mortgage) ..increased considerably from 1985 to, 198-9,,
particularly in CLl and CL2.

Correspondingly, areas under leasehold and CLT

decreased in these two villages.
much less common.

In the Panay Island villages, pawning was

However, area under the illegal practice of share tenancy

increased in P2 and area under leasehold increased in P3. 29
Table A.3 indicates the distribution of area cultivated by mode of
acquisition.

Inheritance and tenancy agreements negotiated directly with

landowners (not subtenancy arrangements) are the two major ways by which

29

Note that our tenure classification--in Table A. 2 is based on tenure status
of cultivators, so that sub-leaseholders and sub-share tenants were included in
leasehold/CLT and share tenancy categories, respectively.
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households have acquired land rights.

Inheritance is the dominant mode of

land right acquisition in Pl, with 49% of area cultivated by respondents being
inherited.

Inheritance is also the major mode of land acquisition in CLl,

with land, rights to 38% of• the area. havi-ng been 'inherited.· :In ·the,vil1ages of
0

P2 and P3, rights to most of the area cultivated were acquired through tenancy
arrangements,with ·landowners, while roughly equal percentages of land cul
tivated (37%) were acquired through either inheritance or tenancy agreements
in CL2.

In general, average area of land transacted is higher in the Central

Luzon villages.

Furthermore, in all villages except P2, rights to the major

-·· "'Portion •b'f 'a:tea: ~cu'ltivated were inherited through the husband.
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TABLE 1.

Parental characteristics, child schooling and inheritance,
by father's tenure status
Father's tenure status at time of marriage
Selfemployed or
nonagriAgricultural cultural
Owner
Total
laborer wage earner Tenant
37
133
105
1. 27
6.54
6

19
55
43
1.28
5.16
1

133
515
430
1.20
7.07
9

142
551
409
1. 35
6.65
20

331
1254
987
1. 27
6. 72
36

0
1. 97
1.96

0
0.33
.033

0.06
0.23
3.55

3.25
0.64
4.20

1.42
0.61
3.46

Year of birth
Son
Daughter

1939
1942

1940
1942

1944
1944

1936
1936

1940
1941

Education (years of schooling)
Father (A)
Mother (B)
Son (C)
Daughter (D)

3.43
2.32
5.99
6.13

5.00
5.16
7.45
8.35

3.69
3.28
6.48
6.98

3.58
3.00
6.64
7 .13

3.69
3.16
6.54
7.01

·Land area·•··inherited· (ha)
Son
Daughter

0.33
0.16

0.06
0.01

0.49
0.15

0.41
0.33

0.42
0.22

3.31
1.84

17.43
5.58

22.70
21.04

19.06
12.17

2.92
4.31

3.08
0.83

5.07
4.41

3.92
2.57

6.23
6.14

20.51
6.41

27. 77
25.45

22.98
14.74

2 .45 .
3.19

2.79
3.70

3.06
4.13

2.85
3.85

No. of parents (couples)
No. of sons
No. of daughters
Sex ratio (sons/daughters)
Completed family sizea
No. of female respondents
·. J< ;\Landholding:,,at:s:marr:i:age· '•(ha)

Father's land owned
Mother's land owned
Area cultivated at marriageb

Value of inheritance (in thousand
pesos, as of 1989)
Lande
16.81
Son
8.81
Daughter
Nonland assetsd
2.82
Son
1.80
Daughter
Total value of inheritance
19.63
Son
10.60
Daughter
..,Change in male education (C-A) ·
Change in female education (D-B)

2;56
2.64
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TABLE 1, continued
Notes:
aNumber of children ever born minus child deaths below age 5.
· •...,.·,bSize of.;cland,cultivated by -the> household,, 'regardless '•of :;:tenure,,status-:' '''".,''!''f.'.
0

cAgricultural land.
dincludes residential house and lot.
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TABLE 2.

Means and standard deviations of selected variables

Mean

Standard
deviation

6. 72

2.52

7..66

2.28

3.60
3.03

3.39
2.69

1. 70
0.74
4.33

3.22
2.42
4.59

6.83
25.26

3.47
63.23

4.93
30.19

39.12
75. 77

6.64

3.70

Variable
Full sample
No. of families: 331
No. of individuals: 2241
Completed family size (number of children
ever born minus child deaths below age five)
Sub-sample
No. of families with 2 or more children: 307
No. of individuals with complete information: 2212
<-Indivi'duals in· families with land bestowal: 1366
Individuals in families without land bestowal: 846
Completed family size in subsample
Parental characteristics
Education (years of schooling)
Father
Mother
Size of land owned (ha)
Father
Mother
Area cultivated at marriage (ha)
Child characteristics
Families with land bestowal: (1366 individuals)
·. Education (years of schooling)
Value of land inherited (in thousand 1989 pesos)
Value of nonland assets inherited (in thousand
1989 pesos)
Total value of inheritance (in thousand 1989 pesos)
Families without land bestowal: (846 individuals)
Education (years of schooling)
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TABLE 3.

Fertility equation, OLS estimates
Dependent variable:

Intercept
Mother's birth year
Years of schooling
Father

Completed family size 8

(1)

(2)

-24.89
(-1. 31)
.02*
(1. 67)

-17.10
(-1. 01)
.01
(1.41)

.06
(1.02)
- .11*
(-1.63)

Mother
Size of land owned
Father

- .04
(. 46)

- . 06
( - 1. 01)
- .06
(-.66)

Area cultivated (ha)

.07
(1.42)

.07
(1.43)

Female respondent dummy

-.65
(-1.46)

-.61
(-1. 36)

Adjusted R2
F-statistic
Number of observationsb

.01
1.40
321

.01
1.42
321

- . 06
( - . 97)

Mother

8

Number of children ever born minus child deaths below age five.

bNumber of observations
characteristics.
*Significant at a

.10.

with

complete

information

on

parent

and

family
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TABLE 4.

Educational levels of children, by family land inheritance status,
OLS estimates
Dependent variable: Levels
of Child's years of schooling
Sample
Sample
without
with
Whole
land
land
sample
bestowal bestowal

Intercept
Child characteristics
Female dummy
Birth year
(Birth year/1000) squared
Eldest dummy
Youngest dummy
Gender x birth order interaction
Female x birth year
Female x eldest dummy

-3197 .11***- 5812. 91***-2102. ss***
(-3.86)
(-3.53)
(-2.16)

-19.69
29.28
-49.33*
(-.94)
(.82)
(-1.88)
3 . 2 3***
5 . 91***
2 . 11**
(3.78)
(3.48)
(2.10)
-814.300***-1498.46*** -528.65**
(3.69)
(-3.43)
(-2.04)
.21
.so
.09
(.80)
(1.14)
(.27)
.49*
.52
.46
(1.78)
(1.20)
(1.31)

.01
(.95)

Parent endowments
Education (years of schooling)
Father
Mother
Size of land owned (ha)
Father
Mother
Area cultivated (ha) at marriage

.03*
(1.88)

-.39
( - . 97)

(.09)
-.14
(-.28)

.11***
(2.94)
.12***
(2.58)

.08
(1. 09)
.09
(1.14)

.13***
(3.00)
.16***
(2.78)

.09**
(2.27)
.06
(1.14)
- .04
(-1.32)

. 21**
(1. 90)
.18
(.79)
- .14
(-1. 30)

.08*
( 1. 68)

- .OS
( - .11)

Female x youngest dummy

- . 01
( - . 80)
-.30
(-.43)
-.70
(1.03)

.OS

.OS
(.98)
- . 06*
( -1. 58)
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TABLE 4, continued
Dependent variable: Levels,
Child's years of schooling
Sample
Sample
without
with
land
Whole
land
sample
bestowal bestowal
Gender X parent endowment interaction
Female x father's education
Female x mother's education
Female x father's land owned
Female x mother's land owned
Female x area cultivated
Respondent controls
Respondent dummy
Female respondent dummy
F-tests on coefficients
Eldest= Youngest
Gender-birth order effects equal
Parents' education effects equal
Parents' landownership effects equal
· · 'Parents' effects· jointly equal
Gender-parents' education effects equal
Gender-parents' landownership effects equal
Parental interaction effects jointly equal
Tests for joint significance of gender
interactions (x 2 statistics)
Gender-birth order effects= 0
Gender-parental interaction effects
All gender interactions= 0

0

- . 10*
(-1.79)
.08
(1.18)
4. 82x10- 3
(. 08)
.14*
(1. 59)
.02
( .40)

- .01
(-.94)
.18*
(1. 61)
.12
(.69)
.02
(.04)
- .18
(-1.11)

- . 09
( -1. 40)
- .02
(-.29)
.04
(.50)
.12
(1. 32)
.06
(1.13)

-.25
(-1.23)
. 75***
(3.22)

- . 54*
(-1.58)
1. 77***
(4.19)

- .08
(-.32)
.38
(1.36)

.58
.40
.01
.41
.20
2.77*
2. 55*
3. 10**

.00
.19
.00
.02
.01
2. 10*
.07
1.06

.65
.08
.14
.19
.14
.25
.86
.65

1.64
21. 76***
11.02

2.10
4.56
6.28

3.74
12.84**
2.12

so
TABLE 4, continued
Dependent variable: Levels,
Child's years of schooling
Sample
Sample
without
with
Whole
land
land
sample
bestowal bestowal

Adjusted R2
F-statistic
Mean of dependent variable
No. of observations
t-statistics in parentheses.
*** s1gn1
. . f"icant at a=. 01
**significant at a= .05
"'significant at a= .10

.19
27. 56***

.20
11. 57***

.20
17. 79,,,,,,,,,

6.76
2212

6.64
846

6.83
1366
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TABLE 5.

Education of children, by family land inheritance status,
family fixed effectsa
Dependent variable:
First differences Eij - Ej
Sample
Sample
without
with
Whole
land
land
sample
bestowal bestowal

Child characteristics
Female dummy
Birth year difference
Eldest dummy
Youngest dummy
Gender-birth order interaction
Female x birth year difference
Female x eldest dummy
Female x youngest dummy

Gender-parent endowment interaction
Female x father's education
Female x mother's education
Female x father's land owned
Female x mother's land owned
Female x area cultivated
Respondent control
Respondent dummy
F-tests on coefficients
Eldest= youngest
Gender-birth order effects equal
·· ·Gender-parents' education effects equal
Gender-parents' landownership effects equal

.08
( .47)
.11***
(6.08)
.49*
(1. 89)
-.21

.36
(1. 32)
.06*
(1. 88)
.27

( - . 77)

.55
(1. 44)

- .04
(-.17)
.14***
(5. 87)
.58*
(1.66)
- . 66*
(-1.81)

.02
(.54)
- .46
(-1.13)
- .11
(-.28)

.08*
(1.81)
- .04
(- .07)
-1.42**
(-2.41)

-.10
(-.40)
-.67
(-1.21)
.68
(1. 24)

-4. 47x10- 3
(-.13)
.01
(.26)
3. 35x10- 3
(. 08)
-5. 78xl0- 3
(-.10)
- .02
(-.50)

- .03
(-.49)
.02
(.39)
.11
(1.17)
- . 05
(-.15)
- .11
(-1.21)

6 .11x10- 3
( .14)
-l .14x10- 4
(-.002)
- . 02
(-.39)
- . 02
(-.28)
2 .40xl0- 4
(. 01)

- . 55***
(-3.22)

- . 78***
(-3.18)

- .40*
(-1.75)

2.82*
0.31
0.05
0.03

.22
2.27
0.24
0.27

4. 96**
2. 53*
0.01
0.00

(. 71)
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TABLE 5, continued
Dependent variable:
First differences Eij - Ej
Sample
Sample
with
without
land
land
Whole
bestowal bestowal
sample
Parental interaction effects Jointly equal
Tests for joint significance of gender
interaction (x2 statistics)
Gender-birth order effects= 0
Gender-parental interaction effects
All gender interactions= 0
Adjusted R2
F-statistic
No. of observations

0

0.03

0.23

0.00

2.96
6.78
3.74

7.24*
2.00
9.28

3.40
0.44
3.88

.04
9. 1s***
2083

.04
3. 74***
786

.OS
6. 33***
1297

t-statistics in parentheses.

· ·f·icant at a=. 01
*** signi
. ·f·icant at a=. 05
** signi
*significant at a= .10
aEstimated for.nonsingle-sex families with at least two children.
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TABLE 6.

Educational levels of children, by family land inheritance status,
without gender interactions, OLS estimates
Dependent variable: Levels,
Child's years of schooling
Sample
Sample
without
with
Whole
land
land
sample
bestowal bestowal

Intercept
Child characteristics.
Female dummy
Birth year
(Birth year/1000) squared
Eldest dummy
Youngest dummy
Parent endowments
Education (years of schooling)
Father
Mother
Size of land owned (ha)
Father
Mother
Area cultivated at marriage (ha)
Respondent control
Respondent dummy
Female respondent dummy

-3265. 22***-6056. 23*** -2111. 61**
(-3.95)
(-3.70)
(-2.18)
.34**
.36
.32*
(2.36)
(1.49)
(1.78)
3.30***
6.16***
2.11**
(3.86)
(3.66)
(2.11)
-830. 36*** -156 7. 04*** - 525. 49**
(-3.77)
(-3.61)
(-2.03)
.19
.37
.08
(.92)
(1.09)
(.32)
.34*
.17
.42*
(1.70)
(.51)
(1.68)

.06**
(2.30)
. 15***
(4.62)

.03
(0.55)
.18***
(3.26)

. 09***
(2.75)
.14***
(3.38)

. 10***
(3.19)
. 10**
(2.39)
- .03
(-1.28)

. 26***
(3.04)
.20
(1.12)
- . 22***
(-2.64)

. 10***
(2.76)
. 09**
(2.03)
- .03
(-.90)

-.25
(-1.25)
. 74***
(3.17)

- . 58*
(-1.71)
1. 77***
(4.21)

- .08
(-.31)
.36
(1. 27)
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TABLE 6, continued
Dependent variable: Levels,
Child's year of schooling
Sample
Sample
without
with
Whole
land
land
bestowal bestowal
sample
F-tests on
Eldest=
Parents'
Parents'

coefficients
youngest
education effects equal
landownership effects equal

Adjusted R2
F-statistic
Mean of dependent variable
No. of observations
t-statistics in parentheses.
***.
signi" f"icant at a=. 01
**significant at a= .05
*significant at a= .10

.32
2. 94*
.01

.21
2 .49*
.10

1.03
.74
.02

.19
44. 96***

.20
18. 81***

.19
28. 27***

6.76
2212

6.64
846

6.83
1366
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TABLE 7.

Education of children, by family land inheritance status,
without gender interactions,family fixed effectsa
Dependent variable:
First differences Eij - Ej
Sample
Sample
with
without
land
land
Whole
sample .bestowal bestowal

Female dummy
Birth year difference
Eldest dummy
Youngest dummy
Respondent dummy
F-tests on coefficients
Eldest
youngest
Adjusted R2
F-statistic
No. of observations

9. 70xl0- 3
(-.10)
. 12***
(8.65)
.31
(1.55)
-.24
(-1.21)
. 51 ***
(-3.03)

.08
(.55)
. 09***
(4.37)
.33
(1.12)
- . 06
(-.22)
- . 69***
(-2.87)

- . 06
(-.48)
.13***
(7. 35)
.29
(1.07)
-.34
(-1. 24)
- .40*
(-1.78)

3.19*

.74

2.26

.05
26. 58***
2083

.04
8. 91***
786

.05
18.08
1297

t-statistics in parentheses.
· "f"1 .cant at a:==. 01
*** s1.gn1.
**significant at a:= .05
*significant at a:= .10
aEstimated for nonsingle-sex families with at least two children.

56

TABLE 8.

Levels of children's land and nonland asset inheritance,
families with positive land bestowals, tobit estimates
Dependent variables:
Nonland
Land
asset
value
value
Lij
Aij

Intercept
Child characteristics
Female dummy
Birth year
Eldest dummy
Youngest dummy
Gender-birth year interaction
Female x birth year
Female x eldest dummy
Female x youngest dummy
Parent endowments
Education (years of schooling)
Father
Mother
Size of land owned (ha)
Father
Mother
Area cultivated (ha)

Levels
Total
inheritance
value
Tij

879.99
(1.49)

1312. 67
(1.49)

1389. 91**
(2.02)

1370. 63
(1. 45)
- .48
( -1. 54)
10.30
(. 91)
11.07
(.95)

2071.63
(1.45)
- . 74*
(-1.62)
-10.88
(-.68)
-13.21
( - . 71)

1771. 36*
(1.66)
- . 73**
(-2.06)
6.24
(. 49)
12.23
(.92)

-.73
(-1.49)
32. 38*
(1.83)
8.96
(.50)

-1.08
( -1. 46)
-15.98
(-.55)
47. 99*
(1. 78)

- . 93*
(-1.69)
27.35
( 1. 35)
14.36

1.44
(1.01)
-4. 59**
(-2.34)

1.96
(.94)
-6. 34**
(-2.17)

1. 27
(. 77)
-5.27**
(-2.34)

2.21
(1. 48)
-2. 71
(-1.49)
5. 61***
(4.67)

-7 .09***
(-3.26)
-5. 10**
(-2.10)
9 .11***
(5.59)

2.60
(1. 52)
-3.31
(-1.59)
6. 52***
(4.74)

(. 72)
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,TABLE 8 , continued
Dependent variables:
Nonland
Land
asset
value
value
Aij
Lij
Gender-parent characteristic interaction
Female x father's education
Female x mother's education
Female x father's land owned
Female x mother's land owned
Female x area cultivated
Respondent controls
Respondent dummy
Female respondent dummy
Sigma
Tests on coefficients (x 2 statistics)a
Eldest= youngest
Gender-brith order effects equal
Parents~ education .. effects equal
Parents' landownership effects equal
Parental effects jointly equal
Gender-parents' education effects equal
Gender-parents' landownership
effects equal
Parental interaction effects
jointly equal
Tests for joint significance of gender
interactions (x 2 statistics)b
Gender-birth order effects= 0
Gender-parental interaction effects
All gender interaction effects= 0

0

Levels
Total
inheritance
value
Tij

-6. 66***
(-2.87)
8. 69***
(2.86)
4. 38*
(1.83)
7. 38**
(2.29)
-2.82
(-1.41)

3.91
(.80)
-8. 70***
(-2.90)

-6. 88***
(-2.62)
8. 74***
(2.53)
4.54*
(1. 68)
7. 25**
(1. 98)
-4.07*
( -1. 80)

31. 68***
(3.82)
23 .19**
(2.36)
95. 27***
(34.33)

42.51***
(3.59)
-35. 71**
(-2.04)
107. 81***
(20.25)

41. 15***
(4.35)
16.38
(1.46)
109. 66***
(35.81)

.00
1.00
4. 26**
6 _43***
12. 83***
10. 99***

.01
2. 99*
3. 69**
.50
3.84
2.64*

.12
.24
3. 81**
7 .14***
13. 04***
8. 82***

.91

.24

.57

13 .13***

2.74

10. 27***

7 .oo*
20. 60***
29. so***

4.80
14.oo**
20 .14***

6.00
16. 20***
25. 20***

-3.23
(-.92)
8. 31*
(1.78)
6.44*

(1.72)
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TABLE 8, continued
Dependent variables:
Nonland
asset
Land
value
value
Aij
Lij
Log-likelihood
Mean of dependent variable
No. of nonlimit observations
No. of observations
t-statistics in parentheses.
" f"icant at a=. 01
.
- ·signi

**significant at a= .05
*significant at a= .10
awald tests.
bLikelihood-ratio tests.

-4309.1
25.26
658
1366

-1754.0
4.93
238
1366

Levels
Total
inheritance
value
Tij
-4682.2
30.19
706
1366
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TABLE 9.

Land and nonland asset inheritance, families with positive
land bestowals, family fixed effects
Dependent variables:a
First differences
Nonland
Total
asset
Land
inheritance
value
value
value
Lij -

Child characteristics
Female dummy
Birth year difference
Eldest dummy
Youngest dummy
Gender-brith order interaction
Female x birth year difference
Female x eldest dummy
Female x youngest dummy
Gender-parent endowment interaction
Female x father's education
, ,Female-,x"mother! s education
Female x father's land owned
Female x mother's land owned
Female x area cultivated
Respondent control
Respondent dummy
F-tests on coefficients
Eldest= youngest
Gender-birth order effects equal
Gender-parents' education effects equal

Lj

Aij -

Aj

Tij -

Tj

-11.19***
(-2.88)
-.34
(-.86)
8.16
(1.42)
.84
(.14)

2.95
(1. 67)
.49***
(2.76)
.66
(.25)
-5. 93**
(-2.15)

-8. 24*
(-1. 94)
.15
(.36)
8.82
(1. 40)
-5.08
( - . 77)

.17
(.28)
4.52
(.50)
4.66
(.51)

-1. 29***
(-4.67)
-10. 70***
(-2.60)
9. 75**
(2.37)

-l.12*
(-1.68)
-6.17
( - . 62)
14.42
(1. 46)

-1.04
(-1.46)
1.56*
(1.74)
-.17
(-.21)
1.41
( 1. 28)
- .49
(.73)

-.20
(-.63)
-.25
(-.62)
.47
(1. 30)
.50
(.99)
- . 54*
(-1.77)

-1. 24*
(-1.59)
1. 31
(1. 34)
.30
(.35)
1. 90*
(1.58)
-1.03
(-1.40)

8. 24**
(2.17)

5. 44***
(3.15)

13. 69***
(3.30)

.63

2.47
10. 54***
.00

1. 90
1.85

.00

3. 35*

2. 70*
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Table 9, continued
Dependent variables:a
First differences
Nonland
Total
Land
asset
inheritance
value
value
value
Lij - Lj
Aij - Aj
Tij - Tj
Gender-parents' landownership
effects equal
2.07
Parental interaction effects jointly equal3.14**

""e:i

Tests for joint significance of gender
interactions (x2 statistics)
Gender-birth order effects= 0
:iJ::->,G~riq.eor,... pa!t"enta,l,;c,,intzeraction effects
All gender interaction effects= 0
Adjusted R2
F-statistic
No. of observations

0

.00
.00

1. 79
2.61*

.78
6. 80
8.00

21. 92***
5.44
26. 76***

3.36
7.44
10.76

.02
3. 66***
1297

.02
3. 26***
1297

.02
4. 82***
1297

t-statistics in parentheses.
*** signi
. . f icant at a=. 01
0

**significant at a= .05
*significant at a= .10
aThe dependent variable is defined as Yij - Yj where Yij is the inheritance of
individual i in family j, and Yj is the average across siblings in family j.
bDefined as individual deviation from the family birth year average Bij - Bj.
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TABLE 10.

Land and nonland asset inheritance, families with positive
landbestowals, without gender interactions, family fixed effects
Dependent variables:a
First differences
Nonland
Total
inheritance
Land
asset
value
value
value
Tij - Tj
Lij - Lj
Aij - Aj

Female dummy
Birth year difference
Eldest dummy
, :Yoµngest ,dummy
Respondent dummy
F-tests on coefficients
Eldest= youngest
Adjusted R2
F-statistic
No. of observations

-10. 78***
(-4.95)
-.25
(-.84)
10 .16**
(2.29)
3.42
(.76)
7. 41**
(1. 99)

.10
( .10)
- .04
(-.29)
-3. 52*
(-1.73)
-1.62
(-.79)
5. 38***
(3.16)

-10. 69***
(-4.49)
-.29
(-.88)
6.64
(1. 37)
1.80
(. 37)
12. 79***
(3.14)

.96

.37

.42

.05
18. 03***
1297

.01
3. 05**
1297

.02
8. 81****
1297

t-statistics in parentheses.
***s1.gn1.J.1.cant
. . .c•
,'"
,at. a =. ,. 01
**significant at a = . 05
*significant at a= .10
aThe dependent variable is defined as Yij - Yj where Yij is the inheritance of
individual i in family j, and Yj is the average across siblings in family j.
bDefined as individual deviation from the family birth year average Bij - Bj.
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.TABLE 11.

Summary of gender interactionsa
Whole
sample

Sample/Levels of transfers

Sample without
land bestowal

Land
value

asset
Value

Total
inheritance
value

. 03*
.05
-.14

-.73
32.38"
8.9

-1.08
-15.98
47.99"

-.93"
27.35
14.36

-.09
-.02
.04
.12
.06

-6.66***
8.69"**
4.38"
7.38"*
-2.82

-3.23
8.31*
6.44*
3.9},.,.
-8.70

-6.88"**
8.74***
4.54*
1.25**
-4.07*

Education Education Education
Gender-brith order interaction
Female X birth year difference
Female x eldest dUDJ:DY
Female X youngest dUDJ:DY
Gender-Earent endowment interaction
Female X father's education
Female X mother's education
Female X father's land owned
Female X mother's land owned
Female X area cultivated
Tests for joint 2 sisnificance of sender
interactions <x statistics)
Gender-birth order effects
0
··_·,,;:Gender-parent-al'' interaction ,..··effects= 0
All genderinteraction effects
0

Sample with land bestowal

.01
-.05
-.39

-.01
-.30
-.70

-.10*
.08
4.82Xl0- 3
.14*
.02

-.01
.18*
.69
.02
-.18

1.64

2.10

3.74

1.00*

4.80

6.00

32.76***
11.02

4.56
6.28

12.84**
2.12

20.60***
2a.80***

14.oo**
20.14***

16.20***
25.20***

'

t-statistics in parentheses.
*** signi
•
• f.icant

at a=. 01

""significant at a= .05
"significant at a

.10

asee Tables 4 and 8 for complete results and t-statistics.
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Figure 2. Trends in Education, Predicted
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TABLE A.l.

Average farm size and technology characteristics in rice farming
by village, 1985.
Central Luzon

No. of sample farmers
Average farm size (ha)
Ratio of irrigated area(%)
Adoption rate of MVs (%)a
Rice cropping intensity
Average rice yield (t/ha)b

Panay Island

CLl

CL2

Pl

P2

P3

85
2.1
100
100
200
4.7

52
1. 7
16
100
114
3 .4

37
1.1
100
100
243
3.6

65
1.4
0
79
131
2.9

47
0.9
0
59
125
1. 9

aFigures refer to wet season only.
bweighted average of wet and dry season yields, weights being the ratios of
planted areas.
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TABLE A.2.

Distribution of operational farm areas by tenure and by village,
1985 and 1989 wet seasons (%)
Central Luzon

Panay Island

CLl

CL2

Pl

P2

P3

Owner cultivator:
1985
1989

9
7

18
11

27
25

47
48

33
39

Leasehold & CLT:a
1985
1989

80
65

76
68

38
31

32
25

8
15

Share tenancy:
1985
1989

5
2

0
1

34
35

17
22

58
42

Pawning:
1985
1989

6
26

6
20

2
9

5
5

1
5

aCLT refers to certificate of land transfer.
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TABLE A.3.

Distribution of area cultivated by mode of acquisition
Panay Island

%

P1
Ave.
Size
(ha)

%

P2
Ave.
Size
(ha)

Central Luzon

%

P3
Ave.
Size
(ha)

%

CL1
Ave.
Size
(ha)

%

CL2
Ave.
Size
(ha)

Inheritance of title
or right
Husband
Wife

48.6 0.67
43.6 0.69
5.0 0.50

37.4 0.75
15.7 0.76
21.70.74

38.6 0.63
28.8 0.65
9.8 0.56

37.5 1.28
27.6 1.36
9.9 1.09

32.6 1.27
26. 2 1. 34
6.4 0.99

Offered by landowner

43.3 0.82

36.7 0.68

46.6 0.64

32.7 2.20

42.3 3.46

5.5 0.44

17. 3 0.73

9.8 0.57

Purchase of title

3.1 1. 88

Purchase of right

1. 6 1.50

6.1 1. 53

6.1 1. 88

Exchange

0.5 0.45

1. 9 1. 75

1. 6 1. 90

Pawned-in

4. 9 0.41

6.8 0.85

7.0 1. 23

1. 6 0.50

7.2 0.98

Others
Total area cultivated
(ha)

2.5
39.8
(100)

1.0

5.1 0.36

1. 5 0.68
92.3
(100)

63.6
(100)

188.9
(100)

122.51
(100)

68
TABLE A.4.

Probability of parents making land bequests, probit estimatesa
Dependent variable:
(1)
(2)

Intercept

Education (years of schooling)
Father
Mother
Size of land owned (ha)
Father
Mother

Probability of land bequest

.24
(2.05)

.15
(1. 22)

- .01

- .01
(-.45)
- .16
(-.48)

- .03
( -1. 06)
- . 02
(-.46)

- .01
(-.47)
- .02
(-.45)

( - .11)

. 09***
(4.58)

Village dummies
Pl
P2
CLl
CL2
-215.83
331

(4)

- .08
(-.46)

- .03
(-.95)
- . 02
(-.47)

.04*
(1. 73)
.16**
(2.04)

.03
(1.49)
.17**
(2.16)

Landholding size at marriage

Log-likelihood
No. of observations

(3)

-209.61
331

. 09***
(4.52)
- . 07
(-.28)
. 76***
(3.00)
.36*
(1. 74)
. 37*
(1. 62)

- .04
(-.16)
. 81 ***
(3.18)
.26
(1.27)
.19
(.80)

-208.76
331

-202.90
331

*significant at a= .10.
**significant at a= .05.
*** s1gn1
. . f icant at a= .01.
0

aProbability of parents bestowing land to at least one child.

